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Materialism, reductionism, behaviorism, functionalism, dynamic systems 
theory and computationalism are popular views, but they were shown by 
Wittgenstein and more recently by Searle to be incoherent. The study of 
behavior encompasses all of human life but behavior is largely automatic and 
unconscious and even the conscious part, mostly expressed in language 
(which Wittgenstein equates with the mind), is not perspicuous, so it is critical 
to have a framework which Searle calls the Logical Structure of Rationality 
(LSR) and I call the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought 
(DPHOT). After summarizing the framework worked out by Wittgenstein 
and Searle, as extended by myself and by modern reasoning research, I 
comment on this first book in a trilogy on Human Nature by P.M.S. Hacker, 
the leading authority on Wittgenstein and one of the best modern 
philosophers. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior 
from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my 
writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, 
Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 





Before remarking on "Human Nature", I will first offer some comments on 
philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as 
exemplified in the works of Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. It 
  
will help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), TLP, PI, 
OC by W, Making the Social World (MSW) and other books by and about 
these geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order behavior, not 
found in psychology books, that I will refer to as the WS framework. I begin 
with some penetrating quotes from W and S. 
 
"The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling 
it a "young science"; its state is not comparable with that of physics, for 
instance, in its beginnings. (Rather with that of certain branches of 
mathematics. Set theory.) For in psychology there are experimental methods 
and conceptual confusion. (As in the other case, conceptual confusion and 
methods of proof). The existence of the experimental method makes us think 
we have the means of solving the problems that trouble us; though problem 
and method pass one another by." Wittgenstein (PI p.232) 
 
"Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness."(BBB p18). 
 
"But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its 
correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is 
the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false."  
Wittgenstein OC 94 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops 
anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 
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"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact 
which corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply 
repeating the sentence ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 
 
"Many words then in this sense then don't have a strict meaning. But this is 
not a defect. To think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading 
lamp is no real light at all because it has no sharp boundary." BBB p27 
 
"Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn't be capable 
of interpretation. It is the last interpretation" BBB p34 
 
"There is a kind of general disease of thinking which always looks for (and 
finds) what would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring, as 
from a reservoir." BBB p143 
 
"And the mistake which we here and in a thousand similar cases are inclined 
to make is labeled by the word "to make" as we have used it in the sentence 
"It is no act of insight which makes us use the rule as we do", because there is 
an idea that "something must make us" do what we do. And this again joins 
onto the confusion between cause and reason. We need have no reason to 
follow the rule as we do. The chain of reasons has an end." BBB p143 
 
"If we keep in mind the possibility of a picture which, though correct, has no 
similarity with its object, the interpolation of a shadow between the sentence 
and reality loses all point. For now the sentence itself can serve as such a 
shadow. The sentence is just such a picture, which hasn't the slightest 
similarity with what it represents." 
BBB p37 
 
"Thus, we may say of some philosophizing mathematicians that they are 
obviously not aware of the many different usages of the word "proof"; and 
that they are not clear about the differences between the uses of the word 
"kind", when they talk of kinds of numbers, kinds of proof, as though the 
word "kind" here meant the same thing as in the context "kinds of apples." 
Or, we may say, they are not aware of the different meanings of the word 
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"discovery" when in one case we talk of the discovery of the construction of 
the pentagon and in the other case of the discovery of the South Pole." BBB 
p29 
 
"Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the 
reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological 
reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not 
consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological 
illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 
 
"...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do 
with conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can 
stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional 
relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is 
defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfaction, it turns 
out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 
 
"The intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction...people 
erroneously suppose that every mental representation must be consciously 
thought...but the notion of a representation as I am using it is a functional and 
not an ontological notion. Anything that has conditions of satisfaction, that 
can succeed or fail in a way that is characteristic of intentionality, is by 
definition a representation of its conditions of satisfaction...we can analyze 
the structure of the intentionality of social phenomena by analyzing their 
conditions of satisfaction." Searle MSW p28- 32 
 
"Superstition is nothing but belief in the causal nexus." TLP 5.1361 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then 
the activities of the mind lie open before us." BBB p6 
 
"We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, 
the problems of life remain completely untouched. Of course, there are then 
no questions left, and this itself is the answer." TLP 6.52 
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"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of 
simply describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are 
neglecting to remind yourself of the most important facts." Z 220 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor 
deduces anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible 
before all new discoveries and inventions." PI 126 
 
"The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the 
conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic 
was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)"PI 107 
 
"The wrong conception which I want to object to in this connexion is the 
following, that we can discover something wholly new. That is a mistake. The 
truth of the matter is that we have already got everything, and that we have 
got it actually present; we need not wait for anything. We make our moves in 
the realm of the grammar of our ordinary language, and this grammar is 
already there. Thus, we have already got everything and need not wait for 
the future." (said in 1930) Waismann "Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna 
Circle (1979) p183 
 
"Here we come up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in 
philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might say---is not that of finding 
the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that 
looks as if it were only a preliminary to it. We have already said everything. 
---Not anything that follows from this, no this itself is the solution! .... This is 
connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the 
solution of the difficulty is a description, if we give it the right place in our 
considerations. If we dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it." Zettel 
p312-314 
 
"Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of 
explanations." BBB p125 
 
Incidentally, these quotes from W show that in spite of Searle’s frequent 
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disparaging of W for his famous rejection of ‘theory’, W makes far more and 
far broader and more profound generalizations than Searle. 
 
These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my 
reviews) are an outline of behavior (human nature) from our two greatest 
descriptive psychologists. In considering these matters we must keep in mind 
that philosophy is the descriptive psychology of higher order thought 
(DPHOT), which is another of the obvious facts that are totally overlooked -
i.e., I have never seen it clearly stated anywhere. In addition to failing to make 
it clear that what they are doing is descriptive psychology, philosophers 
rarely specify exactly what it is that they expect to contribute to this topic that 
other students of behavior (i.e., scientists) do not, so after noting W's above 
remark on science envy, I will quote again from Hacker who gives a good 
start on it. 
 
"Traditional epistemologists want to know whether knowledge is true belief 
and a further condition ..., or whether knowledge does not even imply belief 
... We want to know when knowledge does and when it does not require 
justification. We need to be clear what is ascribed to a person when it is said 
that he knows something. Is it a distinctive mental state, an achievement, a 
performance, a disposition or an ability? Could knowing or believing that p 
be identical with a state of the brain? Why can one say `he believes that p, but 
it is not the case that p', whereas one cannot say `I believe that p, but it is not 
the case that p'? Why are there ways, methods and means of achieving, 
attaining or receiving knowledge, but not belief (as opposed to faith)? Why 
can one know, but not believe who, what, which, when, whether and how? 
Why can one believe, but not know, wholeheartedly, passionately, hesitantly, 
foolishly, thoughtlessly, fanatically, dogmatically or reasonably? Why can 
one know, but not believe, something perfectly well, thoroughly or in detail? 
And so on - through many hundreds of similar questions pertaining not only 
to knowledge and belief, but also to doubt, certainty, remembering, 
forgetting, observing, noticing, recognising, attending, being aware of, being 
conscious of, not to mention the numerous verbs of perception and their 
cognates. What needs to be clarified if these questions are to be answered is 
the web of our epistemic concepts, the ways in which the various concepts 
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hang together, the various forms of their compatibilities and 
incompatibilities, their point and purpose, their presuppositions and 
different forms of context dependency. To this venerable exercise in 
connective analysis, scientific knowledge, psychology, neuroscience and self-
styled cognitive science can contribute nothing whatsoever." (Passing by the 
naturalistic turn: on Quine's cul- de-sac- p15-2005). 
 
And also, Horwich gives one of the most beautiful summaries of where 
an understanding of Wittgenstein leaves us that I have ever seen. 
“There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 
126) as in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it 
epistemological foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori 
knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in 
sense logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s error theory 
or Dummett’s intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in 
Quine’s account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 
132) as in Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to make 
it more complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of personal identity 
for bizarre hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” 
 
A major theme in all discussion of human behavior is the need to separate the 
genetically programmed automatisms from the effects of culture. All study of 
higher order behavior is an effort to tease apart not only fast S1 and slow S2 
thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions), but the 
logical extensions of S2 into culture (S3). 
 
Searle's (S) work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order 
S2/S3 social behavior which is due to the recent evolution of genes for 
dispositional psychology, while the later Wittgenstein (W) shows how it is 
based on true-only unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious 
dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
 
S1 is the simple automated functions of our involuntary, System 1, fast 
thinking, mirror neuron, true-only, non- propositional, mental states- our 
perceptions and memories and reflexive acts including System 1 Truths and 
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UA1 --Understanding of Agency 1-- and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) 
which can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later linguistic 
functions are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow 
thinking, mentalizing neurons, testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 
and UA2 and Emotions2- joyfulness, loving, hating-- the dispositional (and 
often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, 
believing, etc. which can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a 
fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic 
physics, mathematics, make no sense--see W for many examples and Searle 
and Hacker (Human Nature)for disquisitions). 
 
One should take seriously W's comment that even if God could look into our 
mind he could not see what we are thinking--this should be the motto of 
Cognitive Psychology. Yes, a cognitive psychologist of the future may be able 
to see what we are perceiving and remembering and our reflexive thinking 
and acting, since these S1 functions are always causal mental states (CMS) but 
S2 dispositions are only potentially CMS and so not realized or visible. This is 
not a theory but description of our language, mind, life, grammar (W). S, 
Carruthers (C) and others muddy the waters here because they sometimes 
refer to dispositions as mental states as well, but as W did long ago, S, Hacker 
and others show that the language of causality just does not apply to the 
higher order emergent S2 descriptions--again not a theory but a description 
of how our dispositional states (language, thinking) work. 
 
 
S1 is composed of unconscious, fast, physical, causal, automatic, non-
propositional, true only mental states, while slow S2 can only coherently be 
described in terms of reasons for actions that are more or less conscious 
dispositions to behavior (potential actions) that are or can become 
propositional (T or F). It seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the 
mechanical view of mind exists for the same reason as nearly all behavior--it 
is the default operation of our evolved psychology (EP) which seeks 
explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think through slowly (S2), 
rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain oblivious--called 
by S in PNC `The Phenomenological Illusion' (TPI). TPI is not a harmless 
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philosophical error but a universal obliviousness to our biology which 
produces the illusion that we control our life and among the consequences 
are the inexorable collapse of what passes for civilization. 
 
Our slow or reflective, more or less "conscious" (beware another network of 
language games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what W 
characterized as "dispositions" or "inclinations", which refer to abilities or 
possible actions, are not mental states (or not in the same sense as S1 states), 
and do not have any definite time of occurrence and/or duration. But 
disposition words like "knowing", "understanding", "thinking", "believing", 
which W discussed extensively, have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar 
philosophical use (but graduating into everyday uses) which refers to the 
true-only sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our 
innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my hands')--i.e., they are 
Causally Self Reflexive (CSR, termed Causally Self Referential by Searle in his 
earlier work)—i.e., to see a cat makes it true and in the normal case no test is 
possible, and the S2 use, which is their normal use as dispositions, which can 
be acted out, and which can become true or false (`I know my way home')--
i.e., they have external, public, testable Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) and 
are not CSR. 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking of System 1 has revolutionized 
psychology, economics and other disciplines under names like "cognitive 
illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of course these too 
are language games so there will be more and less useful ways to use these 
words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" System 1 to 
combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not ever 
of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought or 
intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate 
network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", 
"automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" --as W and 
later Searle call our Evolutionary Psychology (EP). 
 
One way of regarding this is that the unconscious automatic System 1 
activates the higher cortical conscious personality of System 2, bringing about 
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throat muscle contractions which inform others that it sees the world in 
certain ways, which commit it to potential actions. A huge advance over 
prelinguistic or protolinguistic interactions in which only gross muscle 
movements were able to convey very limited information about intentions. 
 
The deontic structures or `social glue' are the automatic fast actions of S1 
producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably expanded during 
personal development into a wide array of automatic universal cultural 
deontic relationships (S3). I expect this fairly well describes the basic structure 
of behavior. 
 
These descriptions of cognition and volition are summarized in Table 2.1 of 
MSW, which Searle has used for many years and is the basis for an extended 
one I have created. In my view, it helps enormously to relate this to modern 
psychological research by using my S1, S2, S3 terminology and W's true-only 
vs propositional (dispositional) description. Thus, CSR references S1 true-
only perception, memory and prior intention, while S2 refers to dispositions 
such as belief and desire. 
 
So, recognizing that S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and 
contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has content and 
is downwardly causal (mind to world) (e.g., see my review of Hutto and 
Myin's `Radical Enactivism'), I would change the paragraphs from MSW p39 
beginning "In sum" and ending on pg 40 with "conditions of satisfaction" as 
follows. 
 
In sum, perception, memory and reflexive prior intentions and actions (`will') 
are caused by the automatic functioning of our S1 true-only axiomatic EP. Via 
prior intentions and intentions-in-action, we try to match how we desire 
things to be with how we think they are. We should see that belief, desire 
(and imagination--desires time shifted and decoupled from intention) and 
other S2 propositional dispositions of our slow thinking later evolved second 
self, are totally dependent upon (have their COS originating in) the CSR rapid 
automatic primitive true- only reflexive S1. In language and neurophysiology 
there are intermediate or blended cases such as intending (prior intentions) 
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or remembering, where the causal connection with COS (i.e., with S1) is time 
shifted, as they represent the past or the future, unlike S1 which is always in 
the present. S1 and S2 feed into each other and are often orchestrated 
seamlessly by the learned deontic cultural relations of S3, so that our normal 
experience is that we consciously control everything that we do. This vast 
arena of cognitive illusions that dominate our life S has described as `The 
Phenomenological Illusion.' 
 
It follows in a very straightforward and inexorable fashion, both from W's 3rd 
period work and from the observations of contemporary psychology, that 
`will', `self' and `consciousness' are axiomatic true-only elements of System 1 
just like seeing, hearing, etc., and there is no possibility (intelligibility) of 
demonstrating (of giving sense to) their falsehood. As W made so 
wonderfully clear numerous times, they are the basis for judgment and so 
cannot be judged. The true-only axioms of our psychology are not evidential. 
 
Like Carruthers and others, S sometimes states (e.g., p66-67 MSW) that S1 
(i.e., memories, perceptions, reflex acts) has a propositional (i.e., true-false) 
structure. As I have noted above, and many times in other reviews, it seems 
crystal clear that W is correct, and it is basic to understanding behavior, that 
only S2 is propositional and S1 is axiomatic and true-only. They both have 
COS and Directions of Fit (DOF) because the genetic, axiomatic intentionality 
of S1 generates that of S2 but if S1 were propositional in the same sense it 
would mean that skepticism is intelligible, the chaos that was philosophy 
before W would return, and in fact if true, life would not be possible. As W 
showed countless times and biology demonstrates, life must be based on 
certainty--automated unconscious rapid reactions. Organisms that always 
have a doubt and pause to reflect will die-no evolution, no people, no 
philosophy. 
 
Language and writing are special because the short wavelength of vibrations 
of vocal muscles enable much higher bandwidth information transfer than 
contractions of other muscles and this is on average several orders of 
magnitude higher for visual information. 
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Thinking is propositional and so deals with true or false statements, which 
means that it is a typical S2 disposition which can be tested, as opposed to the 
true-only automatic cognitive functions of S1. Or you can say that 
spontaneous utterances and actions are the primitive reflexes or Primary 
Language Games (PLG) of S1, while conscious representations are the 
dispositional Secondary Language Games (SLG's) of S2. It sounds trivial and 
indeed it is, but this is the most basic statement of how behavior works and 
hardly anyone has ever understood it. 
 
I would translate S's summary of practical reason on p127 of MSW as follows: 
"We yield to our desires (need to alter brain chemistry), which typically 
include Desire -Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--i.e., desires 
displaced in space and time, most often for reciprocal altruism), which 
produce dispositions to behavior that commonly result sooner or later in 
muscle movements that serve our inclusive fitness (increased survival for 
genes in ourselves and those closely related)." And I would restate his 
description on p129 of how we carry out DIRA2/3 as "The resolution of the 
paradox is that the unconscious DIRA1 serving long term inclusive fitness 
generate the conscious DIRA2 which often override the short term personal 
immediate desires." Agents do indeed consciously create the proximate 
reasons of DIRA2/3, but these are very restricted extensions of unconscious 
DIRA1 (the ultimate cause). 
 
Evolution by inclusive fitness has programmed the unconscious rapid 
reflexive causal actions of S1 which often give rise to the conscious slow 
thinking of S2 (often modified into the cultural extensions of S3), which 
produces reasons for action that often result in activation of body and/or 
speech muscles by S1 causing actions. The general mechanism is via both 
neurotransmission and by changes in neuromodulators in targeted areas of 
the brain. The overall cognitive illusion (called by S `The Phenomenological 
Illusion', by Pinker `The Blank Slate' and by Tooby and Cosmides `The 
Standard Social Science Model') is that S2/S3 has generated the action 
consciously for reasons of which we are fully aware and in control of, but 
anyone familiar with modern biology and psychology can see that this view 
is not credible. 
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Though W is correct that there is no mental state that constitutes meaning, S 
notes (as quoted above) that there is a general way to characterize the act of 
meaning-- "Speaker meaning... is the imposition of conditions of satisfaction 
on conditions of satisfaction" which is an act and not a mental state. This can 
be seen as another statement of W’s argument against private language 
(personal interpretations vs publicly testable ones). Likewise, with rule 
following and interpretation --they can only be publicly checkable acts--no 
private rules or private interpretations either. And one must note that many 
(most famously Kripke) miss the boat here, being misled by W's frequent 
referrals to community practice into thinking it's just arbitrary public practice 
that underlies language and social conventions. W makes clear many times 
that such conventions are only possible given an innate shared psychology 
which he often calls the background, and it this which underlies all behavior 
and which is schematized in the table. 
 
As I have noted in my other reviews, few if any have fully understood the 
later W and, lacking the S1, S2 framework it is not surprising. Thus, one can 
understand why one cannot imagine an object while seeing it as the 
domination of S2 by S1. There is no test for my inner experiences, so whatever 
comes to mind when I imagine Jack's face is the image of Jack. Similarly, with 
reading and calculation which can refer to S1, S2 or a combination and there 
is the constant temptation to apply S2 terms to S1 processes where the lack of 
any test makes them inapplicable. Two of W's famous examples used for 
combatting this temptation are playing tennis without a ball (`S1 tennis'), and 
a tribe that had only S2 calculation so `calculating in the head (`S1 
calculating') was not possible. 
 
`Playing' and `calculating' describe actual or potential acts--i.e., they are 
disposition words but with plausible reflexive S1 uses so as I have said before 
one really ought to keep them straight by writing `playing1' and `playing2' 
etc. But we are not taught to do this and so we want to either dismiss 
`calculating1' as a fantasy, or we think we can leave its nature undecided until 
later. Hence another of W's famous comments--"The decisive movement in 
the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one we thought quite 
innocent." That is, the first few sentences or often the title commit one to a 
 14  
way of looking at things (a language game) which prevents clear use of 
language in the present context. 
 
A sentence expresses a thought (has a meaning), when it has clear COS, and 
this means has public truth conditions. Hence the comment from W: " When 
I think in language, there aren't `meanings' going through my mind in 
addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of 
thought." And, if I think with or without words, the thought is whatever I 
(honestly) say it is as there is no other possible criterion (COS). Thus, W's 
lovely aphorisms (p132 Budd) "It is in language that wish and fulfillment 
meet" and "Like everything metaphysical, the harmony between thought and 
reality is to be found in the grammar of the language." And one might note 
here that `grammar' in W can usually be interpreted as the logical structure 
of language, and that in spite of his frequent warnings against theorizing and 
generalizing, this is about as broad a characterization of philosophy and 
higher order descriptive psychology as one can find. 
 
Likewise, with the question "What makes it true that my image of Jack is an 
image of him?" Imagining is another disposition and the COS is that the 
image I have in my head is Jack and that's why I will say `YES' if shown his 
picture and `NO' if shown one of someone else. The test here is not that the 
photo matches the vague image I had but that I intended it (had the COS that) 
to be an image of him. Hence the famous quote from W: "If God had looked 
into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were 
speaking of (PI p217)" and his comments that the whole problem of 
representation is contained in "that's Him" and "...what gives the image its 
interpretation is the path on which it lies," or as S says its COS. Hence W's 
summation (p140 Budd) that "What it always comes to in the end is that 
without any further meaning, he calls what happened the wish that that 
should happen"..." the question whether I know what I wish before my wish 
is fulfilled cannot arise at all. And the fact that some event stops my wishing 
does not mean that it fulfills it. Perhaps I should not have been satisfied if my 
wish had been satisfied"...Suppose it were asked `Do I know what I long for 
before I get it? If I have learned to talk, then I do know." Disposition words 
refer to Potential Events (PE's) which I accept as fulfilling the COS and my 
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mental states, emotions, change of interest etc. have no bearing on the way 
dispositions function. I am hoping, wishing, expecting, thinking, intending, 
desiring etc. depending on the state I take myself to be in-- on the COS that I 
express. Thinking and intending are S2 dispositions which can only be 
expressed by reflexive S1 muscle contractions, especially those of speech. 
 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality 
(the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look 
at the table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have 
constructed over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from 
Searle, which in turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in 
modified form tables being used by current researchers in the psychology of 
thinking processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove 
interesting to compare it with those in Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on 
Human Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I 
find more complete and useful than any other framework I have seen and not 
as a final or complete analysis, which would have to be three dimensional 
with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very 
distinction between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and 
memory, between feeling, knowing, believing and expecting etc. are 
arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words are contextually sensitive and 
most have several utterly different uses (meanings or COS). Many complex 
charts have been published by scientists but I find them of minimal utility 
when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain function). 
Each level of description may be useful in certain contexts but I find that being 
coarser or finer limits usefulness. 
 
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind 
(LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of 
Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical 
Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness 
(DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), 
Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
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System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking 
(Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2 and 
Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
 
 
I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle’s 
“impose conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction” to “relate 
mental states to the world by moving muscles”—i.e., talking, writing and 
doing, and his “mind to world direction of fit” and “world to mind 
direction of fit” by “cause originates in the mind” and “cause originates in 
the world”   S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless 
(lacking representations or information) while S2 has content and is 
downwardly causal (mind to world). I have adopted my terminology in this 
table. 
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World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes 
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Conditions 
of Satisfaction 
Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes 
Describe    
 A Mental State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary 
Priority 
5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary 
Content 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary 
Initiation 
Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place (H+N, 
T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily 
Expressions 
Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self 
Contradictions 
No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
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FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
 Disposition* 
 




No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/ 
Rule Based 




A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/ 
Analytic 
A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working 
Memory 












I F/I F F I I I I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as 
COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the 
automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others (or COS1 by 
myself). 
*      Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions 
etc. 
**        Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***      Searle’s Intention In Action 
****     Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****   Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly calls this 
causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
It is of interest to compare this with the various tables and charts in Peter Hacker’s 
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recent 3 volumes on Human Nature. One should always keep in mind 
Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the possible uses (meanings, 
truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular context, we 
have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get 
us further away from the truth. He showed us that there is only one philosophical 
problem—the use of sentences (language games) in an inappropriate context, and 
hence only one solution— showing the correct context. 
 
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, perceptions, 
reflexes) which parts of the brain present to consciousness, are automated and 
generally happen in less than 500msec, while System 2 is abilities to perform slow 
deliberative actions that are represented in conscious deliberation (S2D-my 
terminology) requiring over 500msec, but frequently repeated S2 actions can also 
become automated (S2A-my terminology). There is a gradation of consciousness 
from coma through the stages of sleep to full awareness. Memory includes short 
term memory (working memory) of system 2 and long term memory of System 1. 
For volitions one would usually say they are successful or not, rather than true or 
false. S1 is causally self-reflexive since the description of our perceptual experience-
the presentation of our senses to consciousness, can only be described in the same 
words (as the same COS - Searle) as we describe the world, which I prefer to call the 
percept or COS1 to distinguish it from the representation or public COS2 of S2. 
 
Of course, the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically 
connected. E.g., Emotion, Memory and Perception in the True or False row will be 
True-Only, will describe a mental state, belong to cognitive system 1, will not 
generally be initiated voluntarily, are causally self-reflexive, cause originates in the 
world and causes changes in the mind, have a precise duration, change in intensity, 
occur here and now, commonly have a special quality, do not need language, are 
independent of general intelligence and working memory, are not inhibited by 
cognitive loading, will not have voluntary content, and will not have public 
conditions of satisfaction etc. 
There will always be ambiguities because the words (concepts, language games) 
cannot precisely match the actual complex functions of the brain (behavior), that is, 
there is a combinatorial explosion of contexts in sentences and in the brain states), 
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and this is why it’s not possible to reduce higher order behavior to a system of laws, 
which would have to state all the possible contexts –hence Wittgenstein’s warnings 
against theories. This is a special case of the irreducibility of higher level 
descriptions to lower level ones that has been explained many times by Searle, 
Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS), P.M.S. Hacker, Wittgenstein and others. 
 
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles 
to make complex series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe present events 
(perceptions, memory, reflexive actions) with some Primary or Primitive Language 
Games (PLG’s). System 1 is comprised of fast, automated, subcortical, 
nonrepresentational, causally self-reflexive, intransitive, informationless, true-only 
mental states with a precise time and location, and over time there evolved in higher 
cortical centers S2 with the further ability to describe displacements in space and 
time of events (the past and future and often hypothetical, counterfactual, 
conditional or fictional preferences, inclinations or dispositions-the Secondary or 
Sophisticated Language Games (SLG’s) of System 2 that are slow, cortical, 
conscious, information containing, transitive (having public Conditions of 
Satisfaction-Searle’s term for truthmakers or meaning which I divide into COS1 and 
COS2 for private S1 and public S2), representational (which I again divide into R1 
for S1 representations and R2 for S2) , true or false propositional thinking, with all 
S2 functions having no precise time and being abilities and not mental states. 
Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, 
Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, 
Inclinations, Emotions (described by Searle as agitated desires), Propositional 
Attitudes (correct only if used to refer to events in the world and not to 
propositions), Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses. Some Emotions are slowly 
developing and changing results of S2 dispositions (W- ‘Remarks on the Philosophy 
of Psychology’ V2 p148) while others are typical S1— automatic and fast to appear 
and disappear. “I believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are descriptions of possible 
public acts typically displaced in space-time. My first-person statements about 
myself are true-only (excluding lying) –i.e. S1, while third person statements about 
others are true or false –i.e., S2 (see my reviews of Johnston ‘Wittgenstein: 
Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’). 
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“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive acts 
and memories-- were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 1930’s and 
termed “inclinations” or “dispositions”. They have commonly been termed 
“propositional attitudes” since Russell but it has often been noted that this is an 
incorrect or misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing, remembering 
etc., are often not propositional nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by 
Searle (e.g., cf Consciousness and Language p118). 
 
Preferences are intrinsic, observer independent public representations (as opposed 
to presentations or representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-Consciousness 
and Language p53). They are potential acts displaced in time or space, while the 
evolutionarily more primitive S1 perceptions memories and reflexive actions are 
always here and now. This is one way to characterize System 2 -the second major 
advance in vertebrate psychology after System 1—the ability to represent (state 
public COS for) events and to think of them as occurring in another place or time 
(Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual imagination supplementing cognition and 
volition). S1 ‘thoughts’ (my T1-i.e., the use of “thinking” to refer to automatic brain 
processes of System One) are potential or unconscious mental states of S1 --Searle-- 
Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described by 
primary LG’s (PLG’s -- e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, NO 
TESTS possible so they can be True-Only- i.e., axiomatic as I prefer or animal 
reflexes as W and DMS describe.  Dispositions can be described as secondary LG’s 
(SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be acted out, even for me in my 
own case (i.e., how do I KNOW what I believe, think, feel until I act or some event 
occurs—see my reviews of the well-known books on W by Johnston and Budd. Note 
that Dispositions become Actions when spoken or written as well as being acted out 
in other ways, and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are NOT 
Behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). Wittgenstein 
can be regarded as the founder of evolutionary psychology and his work a unique 
investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic System 1 psychology and its 
interaction with System 2. After Wittgenstein laid the groundwork for the 
Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the Blue and Brown Books in 
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the early 30’s, it was extended by John Searle, who made a simpler version of this 
table in his classic book Rationality in Action (2001). It expands on W’s survey of 
the axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology developed from his very first 
comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work ‘On Certainty’ (OC) 
(written in 1950-51). OC is the foundation stone of behavior or epistemology and 
ontology (arguably the same as are semantics and pragmatics), cognitive linguistics 
or Higher Order Thought, and in my view (shared e.g., by DMS) the single most 
important work in philosophy (descriptive psychology) and thus in the study of 
behavior. Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions and Emotion are primitive partly 
Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, that can be described in PLG’s, in which the 
mind automatically fits (presents) the world (is Causally Self Reflexive--Searle) --




Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking conscious 
Voluntary Abilities— that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries to fit 
(represent) the world. Behaviorism and all the other confusions of our default 
descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot see S1 working and 
describe all actions as the conscious deliberate actions of S2 (The Phenomenological 
Illusion—TPI—Searle). W understood this and described it with unequalled clarity 
with hundreds of examples of language (the mind) in action throughout his works. 
Reason has access to memory and so we use consciously apparent but often 
incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two Selves or Systems or Processes of 
current research). Beliefs and other Dispositions can be described as thoughts which 
try to match the facts of the world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions 
are intentions to act (Prior Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IA-Searle) plus 
acts which try to match the world to the thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—
cf. Searle e.g., Consciousness and Language p145, 190). 
 
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. 
Disposition words can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states (‘my 
thought is…’) or as verbs or adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they act or 
might act -‘I think that…) and are often incorrectly called “Propositional Attitudes”. 
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Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs (cognitive modules, 
templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions—(believing, 
knowing, understanding, thinking, etc., -actual or potential public acts such as 
language (thought, mind) also called Inclinations, Preferences, Capabilities, 
Representations of S2) and Volition -and there is no language (concept, thought) of 
private mental states for thinking or willing (i.e., no private language, thought or 
mind). Higher animals can think and will acts and to that extent they have a public 
psychology. Perceptions: (X is True): Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, Temperature 
Memories, Remembering: (X was true) 
 
PREFERENCES, INCLINATIONS, DISPOSITIONS: (X might become True) 
 
CLASS 1: PROPOSITIONAL (True or False) PUBLIC ACTS of Believing, Judging, 
Thinking, Representing, Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, 
Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), Attending (Learning), 
Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, Desiring, 
Expecting, Wishing, Wanting, Hoping (a special class), Seeing As (Aspects), 
 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - 
Dreaming, Imagining, Lying, Predicting, Doubting 
 
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, Depression. 
Their function is to modulate Preferences to increase inclusive fitness (expected 
maximum utility) by facilitating information processing of perceptions and 
memories for rapid action. There is some separation between S1 emotions such as 
rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger. We can think of them as 
strongly felt or acted out desires. 
 
DESIRES: (I want X to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts): 
Longing, Hoping, Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do 
 
INTENTIONS: (I will make X True) Intending 
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ACTIONS (I am making X True) : Acting, Speaking , Reading, Writing, Calculating, 
Persuading, Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing Trying, Attempting, 
Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, Crying, Asserting (Describing, Teaching, 
Predicting, Reporting), Promising , Making or Using Maps, Books, Drawings, 
Computer Programs–these are Public and Voluntary and transfer Information to 
others so they dominate over the Unconscious, Involuntary and Informationless S1 
reflexes in explanations of behavior (The Phenomenological Illusion, The Blank 
Slate or the Standard Social Science Model--SSSM). 
 
Words express actions having various functions in our life and are not the names of 
objects nor of a single type of event. The social interactions of humans are governed 
by cognitive modules—roughly equivalent to the scripts or schemata of social 
psychology (groups of neurons organized into inference engines), which, with 
perceptions and memories, lead to the formation of preferences which lead to 
intentions and then to actions. Intentionality or intentional psychology can be taken 
to be all these processes or only preferences leading to actions and in the broader 
sense is the subject of cognitive psychology or cognitive neurosciences when 
including neurophysiology, neurochemistry and neurogenetics. Evolutionary 
psychology can be regarded as the study of all the preceding functions or of the 
operation of the modules which produce behavior, and is then coextensive in 
evolution, development and individual action with preferences, intentions and 
actions. Since the axioms (algorithms or cognitive modules) of our psychology are 
in our genes, we can enlarge our understanding and increase our power by giving 
clear descriptions of how they work and can extend them (culture) via biology, 
psychology, philosophy (descriptive psychology), math, logic, physics, and 
computer programs, thus making them faster and more efficient. Hajek (2003) gives 
an analysis of dispositions as conditional probabilities which are algorithmatized 
by Rott (1999), Spohn etc. 
 
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various aspects of 
behavior which are innately programmed into cognitive modules which create and 
require consciousness, will and self, and in normal human adults nearly all except 
perceptions and some memories are purposive, require public acts (e.g., language), 
and commit us to relationships in order to increase our inclusive fitness (maximum 
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expected utility or Bayesian utility maximization). However, Bayesianism is highly 
questionable due to severe underdetermination-i.e., it can ‘explain’ anything and 
hence nothing. This occurs via dominance and reciprocal altruism, often resulting 
in Desire Independent Reasons for Action (Searle)- which I divide into DIRA1 and 
DIRA2 for S1 and S2) and imposes Conditions of Satisfaction on Conditions of 
Satisfaction (Searle)-(i.e., relates thoughts to the world via public acts (muscle 
movements), producing math, language, art, music, sex, sports etc. The basics of 
this were figured out by our greatest natural psychologist Ludwig Wittgenstein 
from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear foreshadowings back to 1911, and with 
refinements by many, but above all by John Searle beginning in the 1960’s. “The 
general tree of psychological phenomena. I strive not for exactness but for a view of 
the whole.” RPP Vol 1 p895 cf Z p464. Much of intentionality (e.g., our language 
games) admits of degrees. As W noted, inclinations are sometimes conscious and 
deliberative. All our templates (functions, concepts, language games) have fuzzy 
edges in some contexts as they must to be useful. 
 
There are at least two types of ‘thinking’ (i.e., two language games or ways of using 
the dispositional verb “thinking“)—nonrational without awareness and rational 
with partial awareness(W), now described as the fast and slow thinking of S1 and 
S2. It is useful to regard these as language games and not as mere phenomena (W 
RPP Vol2 p129). Mental phenomena (our subjective or internal “experiences”) are 
epiphenomenal, lack criteria, hence lack info even for oneself and thus can play no 
role in communication, thinking or mind. Thinking like all dispositions lacks any 
test, is not a mental state (unlike perceptions of S1), and contains no information 
until it becomes a public act or event such as in speech, writing or other muscular 
contractions. Our perceptions and memories can have information (meaning-i.e., a 
public COS) only when they are manifested in public actions, for only then do 
thinking, feeling etc. have any meaning (consequences) even for ourselves. 
 
Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which become 
psychologically effective when they are acted upon—i.e., S1 generates S2. 
Developing language means manifesting the innate ability of advanced humans to 
substitute words (fine contractions of oral or manual muscles) for acts (gross 
contractions of arm and leg muscles). TOM (Theory of Mind) is much better called 
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UA-Understanding of Agency (my term) and UA1 and UA2 for such functions in 
S1 and S2 –and can also be called Evolutionary Psychology or Intentionality--the 
innate genetically programmed production of consciousness, self, and thought 
which leads to intentions and then to actions by contracting muscles—i.e., 
Understanding is a Disposition like Thinking and Knowing. Thus, “propositional 
attitude” is an incorrect term for normal intuitive deliberative S2D (i.e., the slow 
deliberative functioning of System 2) or automated S2A (i.e., the conversion of 
frequently practiced System 2 functions of speech and action into automatic fast 
functions). We see that the efforts of cognitive science to understand thinking, 
emotions etc. by studying neurophysiology is not going to tell us anything more 
about how the mind (thought, language) works (as opposed to how the brain 
works) than we already know, because “mind” (thought, language) is already in 
full public view (W). Any ‘phenomena’ that are hidden in neurophysiology, 
biochemistry, genetics, quantum mechanics, or string theory, are as irrelevant to 
our social life as the fact that a table is composed of atoms which “obey” (can be 
described by) the laws of physics and chemistry is to having lunch on it. As W so 
famously said “Nothing is hidden”. Everything of interest about the mind (thought, 
language) is open to view if we only examine carefully the workings of language. 
Language (mind, public speech connected to potential actions) was evolved to 
facilitate social interaction and thus the gathering of resources, survival and 
reproduction. Its grammar (i.e., evolutionary psychology, intentionality) functions 
automatically and is extremely confusing when we try to analyze it. This has been 
explained frequently by Hacker, DMS and many others. 
 
As W noted with countless carefully stated examples, words and sentences have 
multiple uses depending on context. I believe and I eat have profoundly different 
roles as do I believe and I believed or I believe and he believes. The present tense 
first person use of inclinational verbs such as “I believe” normally describe my 
ability to predict my probable acts based on knowledge (i.e., S2) but can also seem 
(in philosophical contexts) to be descriptive of my mental state and so not based on 
knowledge or information (W and see my review of the book by Hutto and Myin). 
In the former S1 sense, it does not describe a truth but makes itself true in the act of 
saying it --i.e., “I believe it’s raining” makes itself true. That is, disposition verbs 
used in first person present tense can be causally self-reflexive--they instantiate 
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themselves but then they are not testable (i.e., not T or F, not S2). However past or 
future tense or third person use--“I believed” or “he believes” or “he will believe’ 
contain or can be resolved by information that is true or false, as they describe public 
acts that are or can become verifiable. Likewise, “I believe it’s raining” has no 
information apart from subsequent actions, even for me, but “I believe it will rain” 
or “he will think it’s raining” are potentially verifiable public acts displaced in 
spacetime that intend to convey information (or misinformation). 
 
Nonreflective or Nonrational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent 
(which I call S2A—i.e., S2D automated by practice) have been called Words as 
Deeds by W & then by Daniel Moyal-Sharrock in her paper in Philosophical 
Psychology in 2000). Many so-called 
Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are Non-
Propositional (NonReflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them functions or 
abilities) of System 1 (Tversky and Kahnemann). Prior Intentions are stated by 
Searle to be Mental States and hence S1, but again I think one must separate PI1 and 
PI2 since in our normal language our prior intentions are the conscious 
deliberations of S2. Perceptions, Memories, type 2 Dispositions (e.g., some 
emotions) and many Type 1 Dispositions are better called Reflexes of S1 and are 
automatic, nonreflective, NON-Propositional and NON-Attitudinal functioning of 
the hinges (axioms, algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology (Moyal-Sharrock 
after Wittgenstein). 
 
Now for some comments on "Human Nature: The Categorical Framework" (HN). 
 
Hacker is the world's leading authority on W and much of his work has been 
dedicated to explaining him so there is inevitably a Wittgensteinian feel to much of 
this book. This is the first of 3 volumes on Human Nature (the second The 
Intellectual Powers: A Study of Human Nature has now appeared and the third on 
ethics should follow soon) and its aim is to lay out the classes or categories of the 
psychology of intentionality. The quote from H above gives the best brief overview 
of what needs to be described as I have seen. And this description is, as both H and 
W insist, a conceptual and not scientific one for reasons that should be obvious from 
their work. This is totally at odds with the views of many others (most notoriously 
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e.g. Dennett, Carruthers and the Churchlands) who think that not only must 
philosophy explain behavior but that it must fundamentally change as science 
progresses. 
 
A capsule summary of what H is getting at here can be gained by looking at the 
various charts and I again suggest comparing them with my table above. Sadly, 
there is no bibliography-a major failing, but this is trivial compared to the lack of 
any serious discussion of the work of John Searle (S)--in my view, next to W, the 
major philosopher of recent times. Since I have referenced S many times above and 
in my other reviews I will not repeat the reasons for this view here. Recently there 
have been some exchanges between the two recorded in "Neuroscience and 
Philosophy" which appeared as a result of H's views expressed e.g. in Philosophical 
Foundations of Neuroscience which I will review soon. Both authors score some 
points and miss critical ideas in the others work. I have noted S's failure to 
appreciate W before. Hacker is representing W's views or at least Wittgensteinian 
views most of the time so we get as close as we ever will to a confrontation between 
the two geniuses of descriptive psychology --W and S. 
 
Though H gives the best characterization of the task of philosophy I have seen (see 
above) nevertheless his comment on p10 makes me note again that it is just the 
descriptive psychology of higher order thought. 
 
Anyone interested in a concise demolition of Quine (another great mind who totally 
missed W and thus the whole enterprise of philosophy) should see Hacker's paper 
`PASSING BY THE NATURALISTIC TURN: ON QUINE'S CUL-DE-SAC' (though of course Q's 
deconstruction has been done by many including S). 
 
The discussion of the logical (psychological) difference between the S1 causes and 
the S2 reasons in Chapter 7, esp. on p226-32 is critical for any student of behavior. 
It is a nearly universal delusion that "cause" is a precise logically exact term while 
"reason" is not but W exposed this many times and so have others, but this 
discussion is the best and most concise I can recall and it is basic to any 
understanding of behavior. Of course, the same issue arises with all scientific and 
mathematical concepts. The discussion of mental states vs. dispositions is excellent 
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and reminds me that S's continued reference to dispositions as mental states and his 
reference to mental states as representations (actually `presentations" in his latest 
work) with COS, is (in my view) counterproductive. Though I accept most of S's 
ontology and epistemology I don't see the advantage of regarding our seeing an 
apple as the COS of a perception rather than that they are the true only results of 
the unconscious actions of S1. 
 
The table on p147 and the whole chapter on agency reminds me again of how 
greatly this work would have benefited from the S, S2 notions and S's concepts such 
as Prior Intention, Intention in Action, intentional gaps, DOF, COS, CSR etc. And of 
course, one must keep constantly in mind that `action', `condition', 
`satisfaction',`intention', and even `and', `or', `prior', `true' etc. are all complex 
language games able to trip us up as W so beautifully described in BBB in the early 
30's. 
 
The footnote on p235-6 reminds us that it was Descartes mistake that played a major 
role in laying the dead hand of private language and introspection on philosophy. 
 
I see as another failing H's obliviousness (which as noted he shares with S and 
almost all philosophers) to the modern two systems framework and to the full 
implications of W's "radical" epistemology as stated most dramatically in his last 
work `On Certainty', as I have noted in many reviews (and as DMS noted in her 
superb book on OC). This is sad, as I have described how it was W who did the first 
and best job of describing the two systems (though nobody else has noticed) and 
that OC represents a major event in intellectual history. One of the numerous places 
this comes out is p245 in the discussion of doubt where he could have noted that 
`grammar' is another word for the axiomatic true only EP of S1. Likewise, with his 
table on p19 where one kind of `proposition' is listed as conceptual truths--i.e., what 
W called true-only sentences or ideas, the axiomatic EP or `grammar' that is the 
basis for judging. 
 
In spite of what I see as its limitations, this is a unique work of great interest to 
philosophers, psychologists, linguists, AI researchers and many others. One hopes 
that Hacker is able to complete a second edition. 
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Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their 
analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The 
Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in 
Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed. (2019). 
 
